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materiality of technical malware reports and the case
of Stuxnet
Clare Stevens
School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
ABSTRACT
This is an article about how cybersecurity gets “made,” with a focus on the role of
commercial computer security ﬁrms in generating knowledge in matters of
international cybersecurity. The argument is two-fold. Firstly, malware may be
an intangible artefact in some ways, but its success and its interpretation as
malware is deeply interwoven in social, technical, and material alliances.
Secondly, a materialist-minded examination of Symantec’s Stuxnet reports will
demonstrate the politically situated nature of how cybersecurity expertise
emerges. The article ﬁnds that Symantec’s work was not a-political or
neutrally-technical: Their experts made profoundly political choices in their
analyses. By showing the processes that go into making cybersecurity, the
article contributes to a widening and deepening of debates about what is at
stake in cybersecurity knowledge and practices.
KEYWORDS Intangible artifacts; cybersecurity; security studies; materiality; Stuxnet
In June 2010, a piece of malicious computer coding was discovered and
described by specialists, dealing with computer software security, as a
“sophisticated computer program designed to penetrate and establish
control over remote systems in a quasi-autonomous fashion” (Farwell &
Rohozinski, 2011, p. 24). According to the discovering specialists, infec-
tions were most predominant in Iran, suggesting this was the target (Fall-
iere, O’Murchu, & Chien, 2011). Beginning in June of 2010, the computer
security organization Symantec began publishing a series of blog entries
and reports through their website concerning a piece of malware that
became known as “Stuxnet.” Over the course of the following eighteen
months these reports documented the ﬁndings from the company’s
eﬀorts at reverse engineering the malware.
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Though their research and publication eﬀorts were the most extensive,
Symantec were by no means the only source of information about the
malware and its “family” of associatedmalware incidents. Antivirus (AV) com-
panies such as Kaspersky, ESET and F-Secure as well as a whole host of individ-
ual researchers contributed their own ﬁndings to the gradual accretion of
knowledge about Stuxnet. Technical analyses of other malware incidents
have since linked other events to Stuxnet, incidents that shared modules,
coding, or behaviors with this malware, such as “Duqu,” “Flame,” and
“Gauss.”Despite the time that has passed since Stuxnet’s discovery, these inci-
dents are still the subject of research and publicity in 2019: Another company,
Chronicle (2019), recently described their discovery of new elements of the
Stuxnet code with the use of “modern techniques” for malware analysis.
Symantec’s descriptions of the Stuxnet coding was one of the earliest
examples of its kind: a technical malware report entangled in the politics of
nuclear proliferation, diplomacy, international law, and the mechanisms of
global cybersecurity governance. Though initial Stuxnet infections occurred
a decade ago this year, Symantec’s reports are a landmark occurrence in the
emergence of commercial cybersecurity expertise in the context of strategic
state cyber operations. Until this point, market-oriented entities such as
Symantec had not taken such a forthright role in materializing cybersecurity
knowledge on the international stage. As one of the researchers later observed,
“We really weren’t cyberwar-trained until Stuxnet,” (O’Murchu, as cited in
Jackson Higgins, 2019). And yet, the role of commercial computer security
ﬁrms1 in generating knowledge in international “cyber” dynamics are still
largely understudied.
This article is about how cybersecurity gets “made.”Drawing on the insights
of “materially minded” security studies, I argue that the success of complex
malware as well as the political legitimacy of commercial ﬁrms as security
actors requires the mobilization of multiple alliances. These can be conceptual
alliances, based on ideas such as the role of the ﬁrm in protecting customers, or
ideas about the rightful place of the state as security provider (such as “public”
versus “private” security). They can be material, consisting of centrifuges,
buildings, hardware, industrial control systems, HE6 particles. They may be
social links, including the programmers, the “hackers,” the operators, the
unwitting carrier or vector. It might be textual, such as the coverage, news
reports, publicity to make the reports available. Malware may be an intangible
artefact in some ways, but in other ways its success and its interpretation as
malware is deeply interwoven with social, technical and material alliances.
This article will demonstrate that Symantec’s eﬀorts are illustrative of a
dynamic identiﬁed by Balzacq and Dunn Cavelty (2016), one that they
have argued is an important but under-appreciated element in the cybersecur-
ity literature. Focusing on the speech-acts of visible political actors has meant
that “the preceding and preparatory practices of actors that are not as easily
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visible, also outside of governments” have been overlooked in the literature,
missing out on the ways that “the material ‘realities’ of computer disruptions”
are interpreted in technical communities which “then serve as a basis for pol-
itical action” (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016, p. 5). Reports such as Syman-
tec’s are an important constitutive element in wider practices of hardening
facts about threats. Such reports can thus help us trace how some incidents
attain political salience and serve as the basis for wider political action and
policy. This is not just about technical aptitude and seeking out the most
“accurate” or “correct” technical accounts. Instead this article argues that
we need to address how these same incidents can be reported in very
diﬀerent ways and that these are not purely technical reports: They are
loaded with political, instrumental, and strategic choices. There are also a
range of commercial incentives at work.
Given the centrality of technology to practices of cybersecurity, this high-
lights the need for a diﬀerent kind of approach, one that can recognize tech-
nology’s productive role in such arrangements. Cybersecurity is
simultaneously a technical and cultural formulation, with important ramiﬁca-
tions for the political responses that arise as a result. However, the processes
involved in the production of cybersecurity knowledge have received rela-
tively little scholarly attention. Technical reports such as Symantec’s oﬀer a
prime resource for understanding how malware is described, but they also
give researchers an insight into the “material context in which certain security
practices become possible” (Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 15).
After all, cybersecurity “is a type of security that enfolds in and through cyber-
space, so that the making and practice of cyber-security is at all times con-
strained and enabled by this environment” (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016,
p. 4). The reports of companies such as Symantec and Kaspersky see them
acting as representatives, translators and spokespersons for malware. As
this article will draw out then, the interesting critical point is not to simply
focus on how particular incidents came to pass at the technical level, but
rather to understand why particular conﬁgurations of otherwise silent or
invisible actors and computers become visible at particular times and
places, and to ask how the intangible or invisible workings of these technol-
ogies get “made thingy” (Rankin, 2014, p. 664) at speciﬁc moments.
Recent scholarship has underscored the potential utility of studying the
emergent practices around cybersecurity and transnational technologies
using insights gleaned from the Science and Technology Studies (STS) litera-
ture (Collier, 2018; De Goede, 2018; Dunn Cavelty, 2018; Stevens, 2018), while
scholars such as Kearns (2016, 2017), Van Veeren (2014) and Walters (Best &
Walters, 2013; Walters, 2014) vividly illustrate the kinds of material traces
that can be left in the public sphere and the kinds of materialist-minded ana-
lyses that we can productively undertake as a result. However, while these
scholars oﬀer rich conceptualizations and methodological approaches for
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 3
studying such opaque security contexts, these insights have yet to be devel-
oped in the context of (commercial) cybersecurity practices. With these
insights in mind, the article will contribute to the productive conversation
between security studies and STS by showing how the kind of materialist
analysis proposed can help researchers move beyond acts of rhetoric to
examine the “material realities” that precede and shape threat perceptions
and cyber politics more broadly. By engaging with the role of things and mate-
riality this approach will emphasize how cybersecurity and international
security are subject to more than rhetorical securitization but emerge out of
complex material-discursive practices (Aradau, 2010).
The article will proceed as follows. The discussion will begin by drawing
out what is at stake in emergent cybersecurity practices, and the importance
of analyzing the processes of its “making.” Here, the article will show how
Symantec’s work was taken as a-political technical analysis as it was translated
into wider “cybersecurity” discourses and reports. Then, following
McCarthy’s (2018) call to theoretically “deepen” our understandings of the
politics inherent in cybersecurity processes, the second section will map out
an approach that can help us scrutinize these processes. Here the article
will make a methodological argument about tracing “intangible artifacts.”
Malware and coding are materials that exceed human capacities to sense or
understand them, so that they do not present themselves to us in unmediated
fashions: They require spokespersons, mediators, interpreters. This section
will therefore outline a materialist-minded approach that can trace the situ-
ated and contingent alliances mobilized in reports such as Symantec’s,
drawing on Latour’s (2005, 2007) and Walters’s (2014) discussion of
“public assemblies.” The main part of the article will then be taken up with
an empirical account of a speciﬁc site of emergent practices of knowledge pro-
duction in the ﬁeld of cybersecurity, and the dynamics between state and non-
state actors. It will follow the processes as Symantec transform and translate
fragments of the Stuxnet code into “things” and the alliances that they have to
forge to make them meaningful. This will show how Symantec’s was not a-
political or neutral technical work: They made profoundly political choices
in their analyses. In conclusion, this empirical analysis will draw out the
importance of recognizing that diﬀerent readings of malware lead to
diﬀerent goods, or diﬀerent policy implications. This article means to demon-
strate that wider policy decisions about what is taken as good or acceptable
practice are not down to matters of technical accuracy or proﬁciency alone.
How cybersecurity gets made
“Cybersecurity” signiﬁes a multifarious range of technologies, processes, prac-
tices, and complex socio-technical arrangements, coagulating around this
concern with security in and through cyberspace. What was once described
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simply as computer security, cybersecurity is no longer the remit only of
private or corporate practitioners but has become a complex site of interaction
between a very wide range of people, organizations and technologies,
especially in statist discourses. This complex array of material and human
interactions is thus captured by an heterogenous set of discourses and prac-
tices, sometimes with competing purposes and even contradictory underlying
conceptualizations of the thing to be secured. Because it is gradually emerging
with the growth and penetration of networked technologies, cybersecurity is
therefore not a static set of discourses and practices. It is a work-in-progress,
emergent along with the recursive interactions of communications technol-
ogies with their associated societal processes. There are many sites where
cybersecurity appears and is “made” as a result, co-produced between a
wide range of users, groups, institutions, laws, materials, protocols and prac-
titioners (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016). As critical security studies empha-
size, “security is time and again ‘in the making’” (Schouten, 2014, p. 25). The
research and reports of commercial security actors such as Symantec are but
one small facet of this messy emergent ecosystem.
However, the role of commercial cybersecurity ﬁrms and their technical
reports has had relatively little academic attention.2 Because so much of
these networks and infrastructures are in private and corporate hands (esti-
mates of around 90% in the United States for example), the private sector
is hailed by the state as the “cornerstone” of cybersecurity strategies (Carr,
2016; White House, 2003, p. vii). To the extent that this complexity and
breadth of actors in cybersecurity arrangements has been addressed in the lit-
erature, it has as mirrored this concern in oﬃcial policy discourses, describing
the role of commercial ﬁrms role within the idiom of “public-private partner-
ships” (Bossong & Wagner, 2016; Carr, 2016; Christensen & Petersen, 2017;
Dunn-Cavelty & Suter, 2009). Yet there are distinctive features to the
dynamics in cybersecurity which suggest that there are limitations to trying
to understand the role of the commercial actors in cybersecurity through
the framework of a PPP (Collier, 2018; McCarthy, 2018).
Cybersecurity is not something that was once the state’s duty and which
they subsequently delegated to commercial actors (Eichensehr, 2017). It is
an issue that is emerging with the development and integration of information
communication technologies with everyday life. Cybersecurity is therefore not
just the privatization of a previously government roles, but the emergence of
an entirely new kind of public good in which state-based and commercial
actors are negotiating and sometimes even contesting the boundaries for
their respective roles and responsibilities. In the context of broader trends
in security governance, the PPP model thus has limitations to such a way
of conceptualizing the relationships between state-based and commercial
security rationales. In fact, the complex social, political, technical, and econ-
omic processes that are informing cybersecurity practices have led some
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scholars to argue that these processes exceed traditional framings of “public”
and “private” (Collier, 2018). A further critical point emerges. Conceptual fra-
meworks that start uncritically from this analytical distinction risk missing
from their accounts some of the complex processes symptomatic of cyberse-
curity practices, whilst also uncritically reproducing those normative and pol-
itical assumptions (McCarthy, 2018). These insights are salient starting points
in the case of Symantec and other commercial ﬁrms.
In addition to their role as owners and operators of infrastructures and net-
works, the expertise of commercial actors is also a key resource as far as pol-
icymakers and advisers are concerned. In the case of Symantec’s analysis of
Stuxnet, their work formed an integral part of much of the media reportage
and academic writing that followed the deployment of the malware and con-
tributed to the narrative of “Stuxnet” as a geopolitical event. For example, the
think-tank Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) worked with
Symantec to produce a series of reports regarding the technical details of
Stuxnet and its intended target (Albright, Brannan, & Walrond, 2010; Alb-
right & Stricker, 2010; ISIS, 2013). Both organizations then cited each other
as sources for their work: in line with academic traditions of referencing,
this was certainly intended to give their analyses more credibility (Albright,
Brannan, & Walrond, 2011; ISIS, 2013; Mcdonald, O’Murchu, Doherty, &
Chien, 2013). The United States Congressional Research Service (CRS), an
organization that seeks to provide “timely, objective, authoritative and conﬁ-
dential” (Congressional Research Service website, 2014) research to members
of the U.S. Congress, also drew on Symantec’s analysis as a primary source
(Kerr, Rollins, & Theohary, 2010). Then in 2011, in a research report “pre-
pared for the Oﬃce of the Secretary of Defense,” RAND drew upon Syman-
tec’s reports to draw out the technical features of a report they entitled the
Cyberworm that knows no boundaries (Porche, Sollinger, & McKay, 2011,
p. ii). This is a cursory sample of all the think tank and policy advice that
drew upon Symantec’s reports, but it is indicative of the extent to which
the company’s analyses were utilized in reports intended to shape the knowl-
edge of policy and decision makers. However, as the later analysis will draw
out, this reporting was not simply “objective” technical knowledge even if it
was taken as such.
An immediate objection raised here would be to argue that the widespread
citation of Symantec’s reports merely represents a pragmatic division of labor.
However, the point is not to refute the accuracy or the content of Symantec’s
work, but to challenge the ways that this knowledge gets “translated” into
policy contexts and assembled into cybersecurity knowledge. Symantec also
published and still maintain the website page for W.32 Stuxnet on their
“Security Center” site (Shearer, 2019). This page contains the outline of the
Infection, Functionality, Removal and “Technical Details,” but none of the
speculation and broader geopolitical context of the malware incident.
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Yet, it was Symantec’s blogs and whitepaper reports that were by far the
most common source used by the subsequent coverage, not their “Technical
Details” page. Symantec, like many vendors in the computer security industry,
refer to their reports as “whitepapers,” but given their format they are often
taken as (neutral) technical reports of “the facts.” As a case in point, a publi-
cation produced under theNATOCooperative CyberDefense Centre of Excel-
lence (CCDCOE) cited Symantec’s analysis, amongst other vendors, in a report
entitled Stuxnet Facts Report: A Technical and Strategic Analysis (De Falco,
2012). Meanwhile, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)
in its 2018 Threat Landscape Report similarly cited Symantec’s analysis of
Stuxnet, not their “Technical Analysis” webpage, and cited it along with a
number of other vendors under the category of “Authoritative References”
(ENISA, 2018, p. 29, 32). Symantec’s reports nowhere use the word “cyber”
or “cybersecurity,” and yet their reports formed an integral part of the sub-
sequent “cybersecurity” policy literature and think tank coverage. Further,
while somuch of themedia coverage and subsequent policy-oriented interpret-
ation of Stuxnet drew on the reports and blogs, this was instead of the still
detailed but less narrative “Technical Details” posting on Symantec’s website.
The formatting of their whitepapers is such that it gives the appearance of
(objective) technical reporting. In both the Stuxnet Dossier and the Stuxnet 0.5
reports, they include the detailed breakdown of diﬀerent components and
modules in the malware samples, and include graphs, diagrams, tables and
code samples, presentation details that immediately connote a scientistic
approach synonymous with other technical publications. Although Symantec
appear to be careful in their use of terminology (describing the report as a
dossier, and never referring to it as “technical analysis” per se), the presen-
tation style of their “whitepaper” invokes a cultural vocabulary of “objective”
and “scientiﬁc” knowledge. They do not discuss their methods or method-
ologies for analyzing the malware, and nor do they include any explicit
claim of objective or technical expertise. However, as the selective range of
publications highlighted above indicates, this has not precluded their
reports from getting taken as a-political matters of fact. It is not that they
were used and cited that needs to be given more consideration, but that
they were taken as a-political technical knowledge. While Symantec and
other commercial vendors may not intend for their work to be taken as objec-
tive, as it travels through diﬀerent contexts and gets re-used and cited then its
“authority” gets translated and concretized.
However, as this paper will demonstrate shortly, turning malware into an
intelligible event is neither neutral nor a-political. Not only did Symantec’s
analysis thus get translated into discourses of “cybersecurity” as a matter of
international political concern, the analysis later in this paper shows how
they also themselves assembled a range of actors and materials to makes the
malware meaningful as an event. Cybersecurity appears at a large number of
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locations and settings, each with its own set of practices and habits. Though
only a tiny fraction of the overall landscape of multifarious processes and con-
texts that make up “cybersecurity” practices, reports such as Symantec’s rep-
resent pivotal moments for understanding the processes in the “making” of
cybersecurity. But as the next section will draw out, it is not just that the
phenomena of cyberspace and cybersecurity are technically complex and
diﬃcult to grasp, but that they are also complex because they are made up of
elements that necessarily exceed our capacity to know them. Here, the
concept of “intangible artifacts” oﬀers some useful insights for recognizing
the political nature of such technical knowledge practices.
Materializing malware (or, materials and methods)
Stuxnet is a salient example of a class of politically contested artifacts that was
embroiled in and contributed to geopolitical controversies. Here, the role of
“intangible artifacts” can be a useful heuristic for the apparent challenges
posed by security worlds (Rankin, 2014). Intangible artifacts are a class of
objects that are “selectively visible, semi-permanent, and always ﬂirting stra-
tegically with conventional forms of physicality,” like radio waves, gamma
rays, gas particles and toxic spills and other forms of politically contested
but aﬀective entities (Rankin, 2014, p. 625). At the smallest unit of analysis,
Stuxnet is described as an example of computer code. Code is a series of
instructions that transduce input and consequently performs work by interfa-
cing the virtual (the world as 0s and 1s as on/oﬀ signals) with the material
(Kitchin & Dodge, 2011). It lacks materiality in itself–code exists in the
same way that speech or music exist, in that they have eﬀects and can be rep-
resented and recorded to a media in textual form (Kitchin & Dodge, 2011,
p. 24). The interesting thing about malware code is that it’s productiveness,
its ability to act, only emerges as it travels across materials, and interacts
with the things its written on.
I suggest that malware is another example of this class of politically con-
tested and contestable intangible objects. When “objects” in security studies
may lack an obvious and immediately present materiality–for example only
known at the level of rumor, or not fully disclosed (Walters, 2014)—then a
new way of analyzing these objects is helpful. The ﬁrst materialist element
of this paper therefore follows on from Law and Singleton (2005), who
argue that an examination of the ontological constitution of objects can “sen-
sitize us to the way in which subjects and things can become active partici-
pants in political disputes” (Walters, 2014, p. 104).
Though the Stuxnet code lacks a physical materiality or corporeality except
for the material it is “written” on or temporarily “trapped” in, by tracing the
alliances made amongst and between the actors in these reports, analysts can
interrogate the ways in which epistemic practices are embroiled in the making
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and deﬁning of international cybersecurity practices. We should therefore ask
how these intangible artifacts have been made “visible, persistent, and obdu-
rate—through language, law, or their entanglements with more conventional
objects” (Rankin, 2014, p. 664). Like other imperceptible hazards, apprehend-
ing the object and any risks that it poses requires its articulation and trans-
lation as such (Kuchinskaya, 2014). Such an analysis can therefore show
where materiality is making a diﬀerence (Austin, 2017). Symantec’s eﬀorts
are demonstrative of these kinds of productive eﬀorts.
Intangible or opaque objects may be “made thingy” at diﬀerent times and
in diﬀerent socio-historical contexts (Rankin, 2014), but these artifacts are not
passive canvasses for representation. Dunn Cavelty (2018) has made a persua-
sive case for the need for an approach that can understand why some technol-
ogies elicit widespread reaction or political debate, whilst others stay in the
background, uncontested or invisible. This means asking what kinds of inci-
dents and materials become visible, and how: Symantec’s reportage is a useful
window into these practices, allowing us to trace how “technical” knowledge
gets translated into oﬃcial reports, legislation and political or partisan contro-
versy. As the discussion so far has already touched upon, we have begun to
trace how practitioners, international oriented actors, elected oﬃcials and
military leaders amongst others hail or include or exclude certain technologies
or artifacts in by drawing on speciﬁc readings of these incidents. Despite the
opacity of these commercial practices and the technologies involved, and the
diﬃculties posed by restricted access, by asking these kinds of questions an
analysis can capture the dynamics that are helping to constitute cybersecurity
in speciﬁc relational ways.
This article does not mean to dispute the technical abilities or capacities of
Symantec’s analysis. Instead, it is more concerned with demonstrating the
political and strategic choices that were made through the company’s cover-
age of the incident. The approach outlined in this paper thus enables us to
interrogate the ways in which the very material existence of a thing itself
can become a political matter.
The second materialist element to this article’s method draws on Latour’s
(2005, 2007) and Walters’s (2014) discussion of “public assemblies.” Latour
characterizes politics as being typiﬁed by realist epistemologies that
presume in the presentation and assertion of indisputable facts–his counter
to this is the concept of dingpolitik, or politics oriented around “matters of
concern” and controversies (Latour, 2005, 2007). Walters builds on Latour’s
discussion, suggesting that such controversies are cases that cannot be
resolved in the realist sense, because of the impossibility of calling on “a
world of indisputable facts that exists outside any scheme of representation”
(Walters, 2014, p. 104). Instead, such matters of concern are brought into
public assemblies, which operate as sites of representation and knowledge
production. As the discussion will show later, this article will showcase the
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analytical utility of approaching Symantec’s analyses of Stuxnet as an example
of a “public assembly” in this regard.
Analyzing commercial incident reports like Symantec’s (or other compa-
nies such as Kaspersky and ESET’s as the paper will shortly discuss) is
helpful not because it allows us to draw general relationships between
malware and international cybersecurity politics, but because it shows just
how much the alliances forged in these reports are needed in order to turn
“malware” into intelligible incidents or objects. Reports such as Symantec’s
are pivotal moments in the materialization of such traces, and it is these alli-
ances and materials that serve to lend weight to both Stuxnet as code and
Stuxnet as an assembly being mobilized by Symantec. As the analysis in the
next section will illustrate, studying public assemblies (such as Symantec’s
analyses of Stuxnet) are thus a useful way into understanding some of the
ways that intangible artifacts can evolve into of political matters of concern.
It will also draw out a means of recognizing how materials are temporarily
ﬁxed or mobilized in these arrays. Public reports are knowledge-making prac-
tices, and how these assemblies deﬁne and mobilize objects are an important
part of how cyberspace operations materialize in the public sphere.
The following analysis will predominantly draw upon three reports by
Symantec: W32.Stuxnet (Falliere et al., 2011), Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing
Link (Mcdonald et al., 2013) and will also discuss extracts from a series of
posts on their Security Response blog dated between the 16th July 2010
until the date of the publication of the second Stuxnet 0.5 report in February
2013. This analysis will deﬁne the network being drawn into a public assembly
by Symantec in their eﬀorts to generate knowledge about Stuxnet.
Turning Stuxnet into an assembly and object
Symantec’s report is full of dynamic and multifarious objects and actors: the
computer program code, the operators of the targeted equipment, the creators
of the code, the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and centrifuges, the
uranium hexaﬂuoride for enrichment and important organizations on the
international stage as well as Symantec themselves. What Symantec strived
to do was to bring all of these elements into an assembly by weaving a narra-
tive of the Stuxnet “attack” that served to reinforce the importance of the inci-
dent for matters of international security
The object
The ﬁrst aspect of their assembly focused around the “object” of the code
itself. Throughout the reportage generated by Symantec, a piece of computer
coding is demarcated and then described as “threat” and “malicious”
Around these “malicious binaries” (Falliere et al., 2011, p. 3) Symantec
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draws in an assembly, turning this assembly into an object of knowledge
(Stuxnet) as well as the piece of code that lies at the heart of the assembly.
In their main report on Stuxnet, the researchers describe an “Attack Scen-
ario,” a narrative which helps to materialize the eﬀects of the intangible
code into its real world eﬀects, even while admitting that it is “speculation
[emphasis added] driven by the technical features of Stuxnet” (Falliere
et al., 2011, p. 3). In this opening section, the aﬀordances or technical capa-
bilities of the code are what set it apart and concretizes the malware’s eﬀects:
“Each feature of Stuxnet was implemented for a speciﬁc reason and for the
ﬁnal goal of potentially sabotaging the [Industrial Control Systems]” (Fall-
iere et al., 2011, p. 3).
Symantec’s analysis of Stuxnet discusses in detail the technical character-
istics of the code that allowed it to proliferate across the computer networks
in Iran and elsewhere, doing so in a way that turned it into an intelligible arti-
fact. The code itself used a hitherto unparalleled range of characteristics to
hide itself from operators of the targeted equipment. The list of Stuxnet’s fea-
tures are numerous, including the ability to circumvent antivirus programs,
use stolen digital security certiﬁcates to fool systems into thinking the
malware components are legitimate operations, an ability to search out very
speciﬁc conﬁgurations of industrial equipment and then hide its presence
from equipment operators by interrupting the security feedback information
of that equipment by displaying data it had pre-recorded (Falliere et al., 2011).
Symantec use a graphic to neatly distill the workﬂow or decision tree that the
code goes through before it installs itself onto the system (Falliere et al., 2011,
pp. 16–18). These kinds of diagrams and tables help to make Stuxnet an intel-
ligible artifact.
For Symantec to be able to ascribe any intent to these modules and features
though, they had to describe the technical aﬀordances in detail: these capabili-
ties do not speak for themselves. Furthermore, understanding their intent
relies on witnessing their performance: “[T]he ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of soft-
ware cannot be determined before said performance and its interpretation
because it always incorporates a range of possible becomings in its code”
(Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016, p. 7). In the case of Symantec’s assembly,
they had to establish the links between the fragments of decompiled code
and the ways that it would execute in the targeted systems. This is like
trying to recreate all the unfolding movements of a dance from a series of
polaroid snapshots of static dancers. The way that programs perform
cannot always be predicted or simply “read” from the decompiled code:
Their performance or execution are immanent within the complex interleav-
ing of code, ﬁrmware and hardware that makes up global networked ICTs
(Joque, 2018). As a result, Symantec had to run some in virtual sandboxes
and set up a simulated Step 7 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) environ-
ment to observe it in action (Falliere, 2010; Zetter, 2014, p. 227). The malware
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would not speak for itself in its static form to reveal its target destination and
intent. It required translation.
Symantec make several judgements in the way they draw their report
together, beyond purely technical descriptions of the way the malware
behaves. This “attack vectors” section of the report is a concise technical
description of one element of the infection process, but goes one step
further, drawing other actors and a wider political context into their assembly.
This is not something they do in their “Technical Analysis” webpage (Shearer,
2019), suggesting that it was not simply a matter that they lacked the extra
information for their webpage as the online resource is still maintained and
updateable. Symantec describe one of the parameters that this infection
process looks for. When a system has already been infected by the malware
before, it leaves a marker in the registry of the system, a string of numbers
which the malware looks for before infecting a system. If it ﬁnds that string
in the registry, the process stops, and it proceeds no further. However, Syman-
tec suggest that the number string–“19790509”–is a date, and one with politi-
cal signiﬁcance. In their report, they suggest that this
date could be an arbitrary date, a birth date, or some other signiﬁcant date.
While on May 9, 1979 a variety of historical events occurred, according to
Wikipedia “Habib Elghanian was executed by a ﬁring squad in Tehran
sending shock waves through the closely knit Iranian Jewish community. He
was the ﬁrst Jew and one of the ﬁrst civilians to be executed by the new
Islamic government. This prompted the mass exodus of the once 100,000
member strong Jewish community of Iran which continues to this day.” (Fall-
iere et al., 2011, p. 18)
This string of numbers was subject to a good deal of controversy amongst
other security researchers and was declared “circumstantial evidence” at
best (Cluley, 2010). While Symantec “cautions readers on drawing any attri-
bution conclusions,” they still decided to include this information in an other-
wise code-based analysis section. ESET’s report on Stuxnet also conducted a
similar ﬂow-analysis of Stuxnet’s infection (Matrosov, Rodionov, Harley, &
Malcho, 2010), but unlike Symantec, declined to draw wider associations
into their report.
Symantec’s analysis makes judgements in the links it forges in its assembly
again in its discussion of a line of code in one of the malware’s drivers. One of
the ﬁle pathways in the driver is listed as:
b:\myrtus\src\objfre_w2k_x86\i386\guava.pdb
Again, Symantec acknowledge that this is conjecture drawing on Wikipedia,
but include the following in their report anyway:
The string could have no signiﬁcant meaning; however, a variety of interpret-
ations have been discussed. Myrtus could be “MyRTUs”. RTU stands for
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remote terminal unit and are similar to a PLC and, in some environments, used
as a synonym for PLCs. In addition, according to Wikipedia, “Esther was orig-
inally named Hadassah. Hadassah means ‘myrtle’ in Hebrew.” Esther learned of
a plot to assassinate the king and “told the king of Haman’s plan to massacre all
Jews in the Persian Empire… The Jews went on to kill only their would-be
executioners.” (Falliere et al., 2011, p. 24)
Originally, Symantec had published the ﬁnding of this pathway on their blog
in 2010, and it led to a good deal of speculation. In late 2010, F-Secure, a
Finnish antivirus company, suggested that the RTU portion of myrtus
could actually be an abbreviation for Remote Terminal Units, and indeed
the Siemens PLCs described within the Stuxnet coding were a type of RTU
(Bumgarner, 2013). Meanwhile, ESET’s discussion of the ﬁle pathway
simply stated that it was “interesting,” and did not speculate any further
(Matrosov et al., 2010, p. 13). Though Symantec were careful not to draw
any conclusions from the data by pointing out that the ﬁle pathway may be
alluding to remote terminal units, their reports are peppered with these
additional alliances and links. These are more than just technical descriptions.
By drawing these actors and events into their assembly, Symantec’s research-
ers are translating the code into intelligible events while at the same time
placing themselves into a wider political milieu.
The target of the code
Symantec explicitly draw the target of the code into the assembly. Because of the
very speciﬁc and narrow parameters of the machinery and computers being
sought within the malware’s components, the Symantec report surmised that
the designers of Stuxnet would have required a great deal of information in
the formof schematics and design documents. The Symantec analysis describes
the certain attributes that were assigned to the operators and users of the tar-
geted systems by the designers. For example, it was known by the designers
that the targeted systems were not connected to the internet and so the code
was designed to be able to spread via removable drives (Broad, Markoﬀ, &
Sanger, 2011; Falliere et al., 2011; Mcdonald et al., 2013).
While the target of the code was widely interpreted to be a speciﬁc piece of
equipment, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), made by Siemens, in all
three reports Symantec go further still by drawing nuclear facilities and PLCs
located in Iran into their assembly.
We could see in the code that it was looking for eight or ten arrays of 168 fre-
quency converters each. You can read the International Atomic Energy Associ-
ation’s documentation online about how to inspect a uranium enrichment
facility, and in that documentation they specify exactly what you would see
in the uranium facility — how many frequency converters there will be, how
many centrifuges there would be. They would be arranged in eight arrays
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and that there would be 168 centrifuges in each array. That’s exactly what we
were seeing in the code. (O’Murchu as cited in Fruhlinger, 2017)
The researchers thus had to translate what they “were seeing in the code” into
intelligible events. But Symantec’s researchers also realized that this had sig-
niﬁcant implications. As O’Murchu went on to describe it, “It was very excit-
ing that we’d made this breakthrough. But then we realized what we had got
ourselves into — probably an international espionage operation — and that
was quite scary” (O’Murchu as cited in Fruhlinger, 2017). They did not
draw these alliances into their detailed “Technical Description” webpage
(Shearer, 2019), and yet these reports were the most widely cited in sub-
sequent analyses of Stuxnet.
Despite their realization of their role in an “international espionage oper-
ation,” they still drew the controversy of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program
into their assembly. In their 2013 report about Stuxnet 0.5 they speciﬁcally
refer to the centrifuges involved in Iran’s nuclear enrichment program at Natanz:
Stuxnet 0.5 contains an alternative attack strategy, closing valves within the
uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, Iran, which would have caused
serious damage to the centrifuges and uranium enrichment system as a
whole. (Mcdonald et al., 2013, p. 1)
This deployment of the materiality of the PLCs and centrifuges in the assem-
bly makes the political matter of concern surrounding Iran’s nuclear program
a signiﬁcant character in their analysis. At the crux of this “matter of concern”
has been the uncertainty of Iran’s objectives for their nuclear program.
Despite the high frequency of IAEA site inspections and the statements
issued by Iran about its peaceful intentions, the UN Security Council
(UNSC) has been “seriously concerned that the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was still unable to provide assurances about Iran’s
undeclared nuclear material and activities” (UNSC, 2006). The centrifuges
and PLCs are at the heart of the enrichment facilities in Iran, which have
been subject to inspections and reports by the IAEA and the sanctions of
the UNSC, as well as unilateral sanctions by members of the UNSC. All of
these were drawn into Symantec’s assembly.
Symantec’s analysis of Stuxnet deploys the materiality of the centrifuges
and PLCs as evidence–they act as spokespersons for these materials, describ-
ing their characteristics and operating parameters. Again, a comparison with
ESET’s coverage is insightful: they do not mention “nuclear enrichment,”
“Natanz,” or “centrifuges” (Matrosov et al., 2010). Meanwhile, F-Secure
mention the possibility of the Iranian enrichment program but suggest that
it is one of many possible applications for the PLCs (F-Secure, 2010). The
point here is not to contest Symantec’s analysis, but to underscore the judg-
ments and decisions that they made in the process of translating these
traces into their assembly.
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The presentation by Symantec of these centrifuges and Iran’s enrichment
facilities into their assembly thus intertwined their analysis with the material-
ity of Iran’s nuclear program, lending durability to the assembly (Law, 1992).
This also serves to relate to the debates about the material characteristics of
things like the uranium particles being enriched, as the centrifuges are
being convinced by the malware to interact with the uranium particles in a
diﬀerent way. After all, the uranium particles have to be “convinced” to sep-
arate in the manner that the designers of the centrifuges want (Scott Smith,
2013, p. 21). This in turn would work to imbricate the company into wider
geopolitical “matters of concern,” lending a weight to their analysis. This
can also be understood as part of an eﬀort to demarcate their legitimacy as
authoritative sources of knowledge.
Making alliances with institutions and geopolitics
One of the recurring alliances that Symantec draw into their assembly is that
of the creators of the Stuxnet code. No state actors had oﬃcially claimed
responsibility for instigating the Stuxnet code and as Symantec acknowledged
themselves, they “don’t know who is behind the attack, and historically disco-
vering this is very rare” (Fitzgerald, 2010). In the published reports, Symantec
mostly refer to these parties as “attackers” as well as “hackers” and “bad guys,”
likening them to antagonists in a combative arena: Symantec’s introduction to
Stuxnet reinforces this narrative when they state that the “worm became
known as the ﬁrst computer software threat that was used as a cyber-
weapon” (Mcdonald et al., 2013, p. 1).
Stuxnet’s complexity and modular design led researchers and the press
to attribute the operation to government agencies, or possibly to some col-
laboration of agencies. However, the technical analysis of Stuxnet suggests
some wider implications beyond the diﬃculties of ascribing “intent” and
attribution to code. One of these technical characteristics that Symantec’s
researchers highlight are the functionalities intended to bypass speciﬁc
brands of security products. Here, they describe the list of security pro-
ducts (antivirus software, ﬁrewalls and scanners) that the malware
searches for to help it ascertain an installation process that will be most
likely to avoid detection (Falliere et al., 2011, p. 13). Despite the eﬀort
that the programmers of Stuxnet went to circumvent detection softwares,
Stuxnet surfaced as a threat because of a small Belarussian security com-
pany’s VirusAdBloka software picking up unusual behavior by one of its
customer’s computers (Zetter, 2014, pp. 7–9). Although Stuxnet was pro-
gramed to propagate across local area networks and removable drives
rather than the internet, it still came to the attention of an international
InfoSec community who subsequently reverse engineered and publicized
its existence.
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Symantec’s investigation of this incident would not have been possible had
the malware been able to fully account for the unexpected interactions with
the enormously complex operating ecosystem, or the “vicissitudes of
execution” (Chun, 2008) that might lead to its discovery. While the program-
mers had foreseen some of the most common obstacles posed to the operation
by the complex interweavings of software, hardware and users, in the end it
was its interaction with an obscure node of the network that brought it to
the attention of security researchers.
As well as materializing the code in speciﬁc arrangements or networks,
Symantec’s reports have helped to concretize their legitimacy as experts, situ-
ating their role in an escalatory dynamic between this new class of threats and
their roles as commercial researchers. The reference to attackers and “cyber
weapons” can be understood as part of and contributing to a wider trajectory
seen in policy discourse. This is exempliﬁed by Symantec when they argued
that “[t]he real-world implications of Stuxnet are beyond any threat we
have seen in the past” (Falliere et al., 2011, p. 55). In their analyses, Symantec
also draw the state-sponsorship of cyber security policy into the assembly,
highlighting the alliances they have forged with state actors and organizations
such as United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
(Falliere et al., 2011, p. 5). One of the Symantec researchers who undertook
the reverse engineering of the code said in 2017 that it was the most
complex code the team had reviewed and was “in a completely diﬀerent
league from anything we’d ever seen before” (O’Murchu as cited in Fruhlin-
ger, 2017). For the researchers, this meant that they have had to develop better
toolsets to respond to these evolving threats and malware:
What we hope is that we’ve advanced to make it more diﬃcult for them to do
things and not be noticed.… I would hope we’ll be able to ﬁnd them faster and
see traces, but you never really know. We could be missing a bunch of stuﬀ now.
(O’Murchu as cited in Jackson Higgins, 2019)
A principal security researcher at Kaspersky was more forthright in their
assessment: “We see this battle or arms race emerging and now it involves
some kind of confrontation between the security industry and nation-state
sponsored spies” (Vitaly Kamluk as cited in Goodin, 2015). For Symantec,
Stuxnet represented a precedent where countries around the world realized
the possibilities that Stuxnet represented, that what had been hypothetical
was now possible and that these countries “should get into this too” (Chien
as cited in Miller, 2016). As a result, Symantec would be able to position
itself as uniquely qualiﬁed to study and publicize such malware incidents:
Basically, every country you can imagine has decided that they want to start
some sort of cyber-oﬀensive campaign, and so in that sense, the way to
handle those threats and understand them and dig into them, the complexity
of them, is much, much greater now. (Chien as cited in Miller, 2016)
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By using its reports to forge links and alliances, Symantec thus deﬁned a par-
ticular identity for itself as knowledgeable experts and as a reliable resource in
the ﬁeld of computer security, positioning themselves as crucial barriers to
“attackers.”
This is not about the delegation of previously state security responsibilities,
but about the role that commercial actors are forging (and having to forge) for
themselves in response to an evolving landscape. Their role as experts in this
ﬁeld, and the operations and incidents that they are observing, are to some
extent co-producing each other. As an intangible artifact, it is diﬃcult to
know when malicious code is present, other than when systems or targets
start behaving in unexpected ways. It is possible for malware to be dormant
too. As a result, a vast number of technological systems, sensors, programs
and a whole industry have sprung up in order to trace their residues and
eﬀects for customers. Although the malware included AV-avoidance, those
same companies ended up deconstructing the malware and making their
own reports. These mechanisms and programs have their own economy:
they are intellectual property, unaccountable. It also requires a signiﬁcant
technical knowledge to trace. Nor do commercial antivirus or “Threat Intelli-
gence” reports include explicit discussions of methodologies. Although the
reports of companies such as these aﬀord us an insight into how of intangible
artifacts like malware get made durable or concrete through representation,
we must also be cognizant of the potential biases and judgements in such
reports.
Symantec’s analyses are ﬁlled with technical terminology and speciﬁc
language related to computer programing. In itself this is not surprising as
they are self-proclaimed detailed analyses from an organization dedicated
to a specialized epistemic ﬁeld. However, these reports are not purely objec-
tive, but represent a series of judgements and decisions about the alliances
they forge through their reports. Symantec’s analyses promulgates both this
form of knowledge and an impression of their expertise which I suggest is sig-
niﬁcant because of the organizations and types of conceptual, material and
textual alliances their analysis has mobilized. The enrollments and acts of
translation that Symantec have presented in their analysis have taken part
in a broader trajectory, in which their knowledge has been integrated into
wider statist concerns with “cybersecurity,” as demonstrated in the breadth
of their subsequent citations in policy-oriented reports on Stuxnet.
Theirs was a strategic mobilization and other courses of action were open
to them: In other instances, computer security companies acknowledge that
“[p]erforming attribution in a serious, scientiﬁc manner is a hard problem
that is out of scope of [our company’s] mission” (ESET, 2016, p. 11). Similarly,
Facebook’s white paper on information operations also carefully pointed out
that “Facebook is not in a position to make deﬁnitive attribution to the actors
sponsoring this activity” (Weedon, Nuland, & Stamos, 2017, p. 11), instead
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pointing to oﬃcially sanctioned reports from the US Oﬃce of the Director of
National Intelligence. In Symantec’s case, the alliances they make throughout
their assembly are thus productive of both Stuxnet as an object as well as of a
wider ﬁeld of cybersecurity.
Conclusion: Assembling cybersecurity
The analysis of Symantec’s reports, and its comparison with other companies’
work, shows that such eﬀorts at turning malware into an intelligible event are
neither neutral nor a-political. As well as getting translated into discourses of
“cybersecurity” as a matter of international political concern, Symantec’s
analysis mobilized an assembly of materials and spokespersons, which
turned Stuxnet intomore than just an object (the code) in the physical and rela-
tional sense. Symantec instrumentally mobilized particular alliances in their
assembly, to turn the code into an intelligible object and event. For example,
by bringing the uranium hexaﬂuoride particles and the centrifuges at Natanz
explicitly to the assembly, they also served to bring to presence the IAEA, the
UNSC and the political controversy that surrounds Iran’s nuclear enrichment
program. Theirs is an example of performative processes of sense-making.
This approach has sought to demonstrate the politically situated nature of
how cybersecurity expertise emerges, showing that in Symantec’s case, theirs
was not a-political or neutral technical work: They made profoundly political
choices in their analyses. Given these strategic choices in how they present the
evidence, it is likely that they were trying to “sell” their expertise, but we must
be cognizant of these kinds of political economies and pay attention to how
these reports get translated into wider policy framings and discourses.
Their publications were a formative instance of these emerging dynamics.
In future, future this materialist-minded approach could fruitfully be used
to analyze other instances, such as “Threat Intelligence” ﬁrms and their invol-
vement in attribution and foreign policy debates. Assemblies and reports such
as Symantec’s oﬀer an insight into how these controversial matters and intan-
gible artifacts can get concretized. It can also show us how these assemblies
then get mobilized and translated into knowledge about and concerned
with “cybersecurity.”
Three important points arise, both analytically and reﬂexively. Firstly, this
analysis has sought to demonstrate the importance of capturing all the actors
and materials in an assembly like Symantec’s without predeciding how to cat-
egorize all the elements in the assembly, whether into categorical distinctions
such as “public-private” or between material-human intention and agency. It
is not simply a matter of “private” ﬁrms performing “public” security func-
tions or of thinking of them as private security actors in the sense that this
Weberian categorical distinction would imply. Symantec’s role is something
more diﬀuse, or more “hybrid” than such a framing would allow for
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(Leander, 2014). By paying attention to the materiality and aﬀordances pre-
sented by such actors, without pre-judging (and potentially reifying these cat-
egories), the analysis has begun to trace all the things that made a diﬀerence in
the outcome of an operation, controversy or incident. This can help us under-
stand the context and the facilitating conditions for subsequent policies and
discourse, as well as the kind of politics that stem from such arrangements.
Secondly, paying attention to materials, to intangible artifacts, though only
ever partial, and showing where they resist or refused, shows us how secret
operations are not just acts of occluding/hiding information, of segregating
knowledge, but are intensely spatial and material. These are insights already
artfully demonstrated in the literature on secrecy practices that bear examin-
ation in the light of cybersecurity knowledge practices (Anaïs & Walby, 2016;
Birchall, 2014; Paglen, 2010). This approach casts a critical eye on the way that
the traces are produced by technics and spokespersons. But as Latour and
others have long emphasized, the production of scientiﬁc and technical
“facts” require eﬀort and are distinctly relational processes (Latour &
Woolgar, 2013). These knowledge-making processes of commercial ﬁrms
are not devoid of their economic and commercial incentives either: there is
a political economy here, but also a symbiotic relationship between the
designers of these pieces of malware and the researchers who research and
mitigate against them. Not only are malware incidents seemingly growing
in complexity and scope, they are also necessitating more and more
complex technical knowledge to mitigate, thus empowering or enlisting the
involvement of a whole range of actors that exceeds straight-forward categor-
ization as either “public” or “private.” Utilizing their labor is a pragmatic
response – a division of labor, as they have the skills and the insight into cus-
tomers systems the world over which state actors do not. But what are the
repercussions? How can we conceptualize these dynamics, the political
power that such companies may accrue through these reports? The materialist
approach proposed here has sought to illuminate just these sorts of questions.
Thirdly, a reﬂexive and perhaps normative point then, is that this kind of
analysis is also a tool to minimize reifying those binary distinctions such as
“public” and “private” through our analysis without a consideration of the
rationales for such conceptual boundaries. As McCarthy has insightfully
argued, if we are to understand who and what cybersecurity is for, without
reproducing existing liberal social formations, we can begin to “articulate
the wider stakes of cybersecurity with greater clarity” (McCarthy, 2018,
p. 6). It is towards this “deepening” of security frameworks that this article
has sought to contribute.
This article has not engaged in criticism of the substance of such assem-
blies–it has not tried to argue that the speciﬁc analyses conducted by these
companies are wrong, or that the involvement of commercial ﬁrms more gen-
erally is suspect. Instead, it has pointed to the diﬀerences in versions of the
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malware presented by the companies, and suggest that these analyses will lead
to diﬀerent conceptions of what to do, or what makes good policy, or what
political and technical responses to malware can or should look like in the
future. If cybersecurity is a complex arrangement of practices and actors
still “in the making,” and if decisions about “right” and “wrong” cybersecurity
policies and roles are at stake, then these decisions are only possible if we have
a standard to work from. In other words, we must consider who and what
cybersecurity is for if we are able to make such judgements (McCarthy,
2018; Mol, 2002). Who gets responsibility for cybersecurity? What role can
and should commercial actors play in threat intelligence provision? Is there
a political economy that may shape the development of these analyses?
These questions are still open to debate nearly a decade after Symantec’s ana-
lyses, but value judgements about who and what cybersecurity are for are
implicated when cybersecurity policies take such analyses as objective
reports. In other words, the empirical argument of this article is largely
about the need to be more reﬂexive about the use and assumptions of the
long-held conceptual distinctions between “public” and “private” to show
how these rationales may not neatly map into cybersecurity.
Taking the technical work of commercial ﬁrms as unquestioningly a-pol-
itical and neutral means that it may come to shape the available policy
options in unforeseen ways. Rather than asking is this policy eﬀective, we
should also be asking what eﬀects the policy may be having, and if they are
for the good. The role of commercial ﬁrms in making “good” cybersecurity
knowledge is thus an important area for future investigations.
Notes
1. More recently, companies also refer to themselves as “Threat Intelligence”
ﬁrms, while those working in the industry often prefer to call themselves
“InfoSec” (information security) researchers, rather than “cyber” or “cyberse-
curity” which predominates in statist discourses (Shires & Smeets, 2017;
Slowik, 2019).
2. But see Banks (2015).
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